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One of the many virtues of this fascinating book on consciousness is a (probably unintended) irony: the book’s main
thesis—that phenomenal consciousness consists in a subject’s activity, not passive receptivity—feels least plausible
in the case of the title example: Seeing Red. If the example had been Tasting Lemon, the thesis would seem less
radical. The reason is that when tasting lemon, or hearing a soprano aria, or touching silk fabric, our own active
bodily contribution to the experience is phenomenally much more salient. In all these cases my attention is drawn to
the effect of the stimulus on my body and to my very immediate physiological response: a heightened awareness of
certain tongue regions; covert tightening of vocal muscles in synchrony with the pitch of the singer; the response of
my fingertips to the surface of the silk. But in the case of seeing red, I normally feel no bodily contribution: a patch of
red seems entirely outside of me, and the sight of it to be something that happens to me. In Humphrey’s 2004 Harvard
University lectures (on which this book is based), he put up a large red screen before the audience, and asked them
to attend to the red experience rather than to the screen itself. When I try to do that, my eyes feel detached from the
redness itself, and as passive receivers. I’m not aware of doing anything to have the red experience. It’s true that colors
might produce different felt emotions, and brightness might hurt my eyes. But in themselves different colors do not
make my eyes feel different when I see them. Humphrey recognizes this objection in Chapter 3, and his response will
be examined then. For now, we may agree that colors, red in particular, are among the most common examples of
qualia (along with pain and taste, which are both felt as bodily), and that without color experience, the “hard problem”
of consciousness would seem much tamer.
Using colors as primary examples of qualia is useful because it forces a direct confrontation with the hardness
of the problem. The difference between color and other qualia is important here because Humphrey’s theory comes
closer to explaining that difference than any other I know, even though superficially his choice of example seems at
odds with his thesis. His book is persuasive that his theory applies even to color experience; I would like to show that
color experience supports it even more strongly than experience in other modalities.
There is a second problem that remains, however. If we confine ourselves to qualia whose bodily effects we can
sense, we still seem left with a gap. Humphrey argues that traces of ancient bodily responses to sensory input are still
active in tiny “as-if body loops” that we now sense as qualia.
For the mind side of the equation, our earlier analysis suggested that the experience of creating a sensation has
many of the characteristics of creating a bodily expression. Now, for the brain side, we have constructed a history
which suggests that sensations are the descendants of a kind of activity which once upon a time actually was a kind
of bodily expression. (p. 98)
This part of his theory is ingenious and seems right as far as it goes. He shows how the subjective feeling of agency
arises from this equation of brain loops with traces of bodily action. But subjective agency and qualia are different
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among sensory experiences—between red and green colors, lemon and strawberry flavors, are commensurate with the
differences among bodily responses. No matter how schematic or how condensed these traces may be, it still seems
that they could be distinguished in objective terms, by reference to the body parts and movements they represent. But
qualitative sensations, color in particular, do not seem distinguishable in that way. I cannot indicate the difference
between red and green by calling attention to any bodily events.
Humphrey achieves most of his goals in this book, as I will argue. I will also argue that he sets up a structure that
might be stretched to account for the problem of the difference between differences mentioned above, but that the
stretch takes us a bit beyond the boundaries of Humphrey’s theory.
After a brief summary of Humphrey’s theory, I will discuss each chapter more thoroughly. Overall I will focus on
two parts of the theory. First: the idea that overt bodily responses to sensory stimuli may have evolved into covert “as
if” body loops, which are experienced as sensory qualia. Second: the idea that temporal thickness, or the “extended
present,” is the key mechanism behind conscious experience. The first addresses the content of consciousness, the
second the vehicle. These two aspects of the theory are somewhat independent. Temporal thickness is a major compo-
nent of Husserl’s account of time consciousness, without any of the physiological hypotheses; conversely, Damasio’s
well-known account of “as if” body loops1 says nothing about the extended present (though his account is compatible
with Humphrey’s in many ways).
The gist of the theory is as follows. As others have also maintained,2 all sensory experience is an activity of the
subject, not the passive receipt of input. The performing of this activity is the semantic grounding of the concept of
“Self.” Humphrey suggests that our distant ancestors would have reacted to stimuli with overt physical movements,
such as wriggling when in contact with salt. At this stage, we cannot speak of qualia. Next, the organism learns
to monitor its own responses, forming an inner “representation” of what its body is doing and thus begins “feeling
sensation.” Humphrey maintains that sensation and perception are quite different; sensation is characterized as follows:
[H]aving a red sensation has something of the character of a bodily action, perhaps an expression. At any rate, it is
an active first-person response to being stimulated with a red light. And, to bring this out, let’s give a special name
to what S is doing here: redding. (p. 15)
Humphrey insists that perception is distinct from sensation and arrived later in evolution. Here, he argues, new
channels provide a new kind of analysis of worldly input, providing “a more neutral, body-independent representation
of the outside world” (p. 92). The animal no longer can feel alone in the universe. Still, for its self-interest it needs
the bodily information provided by the old sensory channels in order to predict the effects of continued (and, in more
evolved animals, imagined) contact with various objects, so it continues to issue “as-if” commands to the body to
produce the closed-circuit response/sensations that we now experience privately as qualia. Thus even though sensation
is now completely private, or “subjective,” it continues to occur in synchrony with the overt responses to third-person
information—perception—about the objective world. The synchrony leads S to the belief that the subjective qualia
are emanating directly from contact with the external objects as they are now represented.
The rich fullness of conscious experience is explained in terms of “temporal thickness,” or the “extended present.”
Subjects are always sensing and perceiving in the present: “Now.” But in objective terms the physical present exists for
no more than an imperceptible instant, disappearing at once into the (no longer existing) Past to be replaced by the next
Now, which had been the (not yet existing) Future. This sort of Now could not possibly be experienced by a subject.
A solution has been proposed by many, including Husserl, of whom Humphrey makes respectful use. Experienced
time is not instantaneous but stretched out, with “room for us to move around.” Our Now includes our immediate
past and anticipated future (Husserl’s retention and protention), which appear to blend together into a homogeneous,
extended period of present “temporal thickness” and slide smoothly and continuously into new presents, with new
retentions and protentions.
Humphrey quotes this reviewer3 who has argued that temporal thickness is conceptually incoherent: past and future
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anything are the objects of experience, and experience itself is not one of those objects. He accepts this claim and
calls it “part of the answer but also part of the problem.” I would put things the other way: the temporal illusion is the
main part of the problem, but it can also help provide the answer. Understanding exactly how it is that we cannot do
something can be as informative about that activity as being able to do it. The last section of this review will attempt
to show why this is so.
Humphrey suggests that consciousness is mysterious and ineffable because it evolved to be that way in order to
make our Selves (which are the primary content of consciousness) uniquely valuable and worth preserving. But while
consciousness may indeed perform that function, here may be a case of Gould’s biological “spandrels” 4 (incidental
structures that come about as by-products of functional ones): consciousness is necessarily unanalyzable within expe-
rience, given the nature of sensory input and time experience, and the mystery is an evolutionary by-product of which
animals like us can take creative advantage. An alternative explanatory hypothesis will be proposed at the end of this
review.
Phenomenology of sensory experience
After an introductory first chapter, Chapter 2 begins the main argument with some phenomenology: what is it like
for each one of us—each S—to see the red of the screen? Humphrey starts with a “subjective fact”: S is creating
visual sensations, and these creatings/sensations “are him, they constitute the very essence of his subjectivity” (p. 14).
Humphrey highlights a point of fundamental importance here: experiencing sensations is experiencing oneself as a
subject. That is all there is to us as subjects: the activity of creating experience. We are not the observers of the activity,
we are the agents, and our agency is constituted by the activity itself; it is not a separate entity.
It is not clear whether Humphrey is describing how it seems for S—to be the creator of his own experiences—or
how, in theory, it in fact is when the process is described, accurately as it seems to me, in objective terms. That S’s
experience is “his seeing red” is a “subjective fact” (p. 12–13). If that means that it is a fact for S, then that he is
performing the act Humphrey calls “redding” must be how it seems to S. Humphrey acknowledges that this fact is
somewhat opaque to S (“. . . just what he is doing will be more than he can fully say . . . and extends deeper than he can
put his mind to” (p. 16)). But still, “This sensation is clearly something that he creates” (p. 14).
How clear is this to S? It depends on who S is. I won’t try to speak for a monkey, but S can be me, and I must say
that in my normal state this is not (subjectively) clear at all. Not only am I in most cases “likely to give the [objective]
fact of the screen priority,” but it is a rare circumstance in which I would not feel, even when introspecting, that the
red screen is acting upon me in producing the red sensation, and that I am the passive recipient of sensational “facts”
about the screen. To be sure, for many ”embodiment” philosophers it has become untenable to maintain that we are
in fact passive recipients of unedited sensory input, but this is the way it normally feels to me as an S. While I fully
believe that my phenomenal consciousness of red is a creative activity, I cannot experience it that way, any more than I
can experience the pain in my toe as a state of my brain [9]. This point will be explored in the discussion of Chapter 3.
It can be difficult to make a naive listener, such as a college student in introductory philosophy, believe that color is
not entirely in the object as one of its primary qualities. Humphrey is here, I believe, taking advantage of 15 years
of philosophical interest in embodiment, which has produced many persuasive accounts of the primacy of physical
agency in human experience, but which may not have yet made its way into our naive intuitions. On the other hand, it
does feel correct to say that
it is strikingly obvious to the subject that the sensation, the redding, has a quality and a valency—subjective psy-
chical properties . . . S will feel that the sensation matters to him; he will mind about it” (p. 19).
But the question remains: does S naturally feel that it is the sensation itself that matters, or the “objective” color of
the screen?
In whatever terms S thinks of it, however, it also seems right to say that “it is our experience of the inner world
that confirms the existence of the person. . . . S may well feel that the sensation “makes him.” But he does not feel
4 [6].
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same sort of experience he is. He is not the only S. It is obvious to this S, Humphrey argues, that there might be some
differences between what it is like for him and for the other S, but it is not obvious to S that the other might be a
zombie; there is an automatic assumption that social interaction is between two S’s, not between an S and completely
unknown quantity. How is S justified in making this assumption? Clearly, not logically, but (at least) emotionally:
“The last thing S wants to believe is that he is the only Self there is” (p. 34).
In Chapter 3, as noted earlier, Humphrey argues for a strong distinction between sensation and perception. Sensa-
tion is not directly required for perception, but it is what makes us self-aware. The first-person character of sensation
is exemplified in the clinical phenomenon of blindsight, in which there is perception but no sensation and the subject
“does not care” about the perception as he would about sensation. He gives an example of a woman who experienced
sight for the first time as an adult. She had never learned to use visual sensation to help define her Self, and so even
when the disorder was corrected, “she did not experience [visual sensation] as a significant extension of her Self”
(p. 70). It might have helped here if Humphrey had provided examples of sensation without perception, but the reader
can think them up.
In this chapter Humphrey confronts the objection raised earlier, that we feel no specific eye sensations when seeing
different colors; he cites other contemporary philosophers who make this claim. The objection seems to weaken his
argument that bodily involvement makes sensation significant for our sense of self. He acknowledges the difficulty
of answering the objection, and does so with a proposal he seems himself to find inadequate: we associate sensations
with perceived objects because of the normally high correlation between having a subjective sensation and perceiving
an external object. The correlation is not rough; it extends to minute details. Small perceived alterations in the object
are correlated with simultaneous alterations in the sensation.
Correlation arguments are not as strong as one would like. As Kant said of Hume, observation of correlation alone
could not yield the feeling of necessity that every event has a cause; and in this case it remains unclear how mere
awareness of such a correlation can generate the conceptual distinction between subjectivity and objectivity, especially
given the position that perception without sensation (e.g. Blindsight) is unconscious. I believe that Humphrey can make
a more convincing response if my claims about the difference between color experience and that of other modalities
are accepted. All the objectors cited by Humphrey talk only about color experience, and what they say seems to
be true. But it does not necessarily hold for taste, sound, and other secondary properties. Seen color is unique in
being completely unaccompanied by bodily sensations corresponding to color differences in themselves. (Emotional
associations and preferences are a different matter—they are not felt as the unmediated effects of color on the body
surface or behavior.)
Why should there be this difference between color experiences and the other types? One hypothesis is that
Humphrey is quite right about the other types, but that color, as a visual property, is experienced as fitting and covary-
ing with the perceived parameters of the object in a way stronger than mere correlation. Color sensation in that case
would not be explained as the result of internalized responsive movements, and thus need not be always accompanied
by bodily sensations.
If the above is true, then the objection worrying Humphrey in this chapter might be answered. But a harder one
arises. If color sensation is not identical with internalized body movements, what is it? This question can be put
off until the discussion of Humphrey’s other main claim: that the nature of time experience—the “thickness” of
the conscious present—explains the real mystery of consciousness, “the factor X” as Dennett calls it (p. 39). Most
importantly, this explanation is necessary not just for color but all the sensory modalities. It is no more clear how
internalized body movements could become qualitative content than it is how rod and cone processes, or their results,
could be consciously experienced. It is also unclear how internalized body movements, however condensed, could be
experienced as visual qualia. As noted earlier, the differences among various bodily responses to sensory input do not
seem sufficient to account for qualitative differences. I might respond to red with one set of movements and to green
with a different set. These differences in bodily response are reducible to the same language; they are completely
describable in terms of different parts of the body, which can be understood objectively. The qualitative difference
between red and green cannot be captured in such objective terms.
Chapter 4 makes a bold and original move. Humphrey puts the problem in terms of an equation, with phenom-
enal experience on one side and neuronal processes on the other. These two sides do not have the same conceptual
dimensions, so how can they be understood as referring to the same kind of thing? This problem is the famous “ex-
planatory gap”; how can it be closed? What is needed is something bodily on both sides of the equation, and the one
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express how S feels about something, we see that bodily action has “five defining characteristics of the experience
of sensation”: ownership, bodily location, presentness, qualitative modality, and phenomenal immediacy (pp. 82–83).
My own actions have these characteristics, and actions are clearly bodily. Therefore, if sensations like seeing red
can be identified with bodily actions on the experience side of the equation, then the two sides would have the same
conceptual dimensions.
The similarity between action and subjective experience in general, is striking and convincing. It must be a sig-
nificant part of the solution. The fundamental difficulty regarding qualia, however, remains. Even if different colors
can be firmly associated with different types of bodily actions, the differences in the two cases are incommensurable.
The tartness of lemon juice is constantly associated with, and may be expressed by, a response of my tongue, but the
flavor of lemon is still unaccounted for. For now, although far from the complete answer, Humphrey’s observation
is clearly a major step. Intentional actions (as distinct from automatic movements) are both bodily and uniquely tied
to the subject, like no other physical events. The value of this analogy can be seen clearly in this simple case: just
as no one can directly experience the subjective experiences of another, no one can perform another’s actions. This
statement can be misunderstood: of course I could do the same thing you are doing, by copying you detail for detail.
We would be performing exactly the same type of activity. But there would still be two action-tokens: the one with you
as the agent, and the one with me as the agent. The occurrence of any specific instance of an intentional action—this
action—essentially involves the agent as the performer of the action. If seeing red is an activity you are performing,
then I cannot do it for you without making it a different activity: my own. This situation is a central part of the concept
of subjectivity as well. That an experience is subjective does not mean simply that I cannot observe the experience that
you are having, as though you were watching a private television that I have no access to; it means that I cannot do
YOUR watching, I can only do MY watching. This seems to be a conceptual truth (although who knows what clever
neuroscientific theories might one day force alterations in these conceptual structures).
This move strengthens and clarifies the idea that in sensation we find our Selves. No inferential reasoning is needed:
if my (nonvisual) sensation is an intentional activity, then I am the agent. A sort of “awareness” of this fact can be part
of preconceptual experience; as an infant I may not have a self-concept, but I am experiencing myself nonetheless, in
an unmistakable way: I am constituted by my agency. My agency will be the experiential (as well as the conceptual)
ground of the concept of Self.
Note that we are still exempting “redding” from this primal agency experience. I do not experience my agency at
all in the case of the red sensation; it can be a bodily process without being intentional action. Not every sensation or
type of sensation would require its own separate bodily expression. In the case of color, the sensation can ride on the
bodily experience of seeing and tracking objects that are perceived. It is the objects that I experience as central to my
well-being; colors serve to distinguish one from another. It is true that bodily responses to different colors differ: a red
room makes its occupants anxious, while a blue one calms them down. But that, as we’ve noted, is a different matter.
An objection to the idea that action can bridge the subjective/objective gap might be that it begs the question in
the following way. Actions are intentional; agents are subjects: they experience their voluntary intentional activity
along with feedback from their bodies carrying out their intentions. If so, we now have unreduced subjectivity on
both sides of the equation. But we might respond by noting that on the view promoted here, experiencing oneself as
an agent can be preconceptual. Being an agent does not presuppose an experience of one’s Self as an agent, which
would require the concepts of Self and agency. Being an agent presupposes only being able to choose an action. It
is an ability presumably available to many animals as well as human babies. It is the sense of volitional agency that
makes goal-directed action (as distinct from movement) possible. Without that sense, an organism would not attempt
to do anything. Recall the discussion of people with blindsight: they can actually perceive shapes and movements of
objects, but they do not experience themselves as agents in this perceiving, and therefore do not spontaneously choose
to make use of the ability.
Preconceptual experience of agency is not like reflecting on the experience of seeing red. In the latter sort of
introspection, concepts of self and external objects are necessary. The acceptance of itself as an agent is already
implicit in every goal-directed act of the organism. In primitive cases, it is not appropriate to speak of a subject making
an association between its “Self” and the actions it performs: the performance of the action is itself the experience of
Self, whether or not the organism can articulate this identity or consciously reflect on it. As claimed earlier, this primal
identity serves as the experiential ground of the later concept of the Self as agent. The objection that using “action”
to balance the subjective/objective gap is question-begging would hold only if the concept of agency were essential
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action can be a sufficiently primitive phenomenon to serve to balance the objective side of the equation.
There is a lingering worry about the concept of “action” in the theory. Humphrey at times seems to conflate
intentional with automatic bodily events. The suggestion above, that intentional action is the only kind necessary
for Humphrey’s general theory about consciousness, might still not work completely. In the increasingly popular
embodiment movement, it is crucial to distinguish between intentional goal-directed action and nonintentional (or
subpersonal) bodily processes occurring in response to stimuli. Only the former can serve as the actions needed by
embodiment theorists.
In Chapter 5 Humphrey makes a nice connection between sensations-as-actions and the recent discovery of mirror
neurons—neurons theorized to be activated by both one’s own actions and the perceived actions of another. When
one performs an action, the subjective sensation of it is mediated by these neurons, and when one sees another per-
forming a similar action, the same neurons form an objective representation of it. Mirror neurons are an extremely
exciting discovery because they appear to accomplish what had seemed impossible: to establish a direct link between
the subjective and the objective—between sensations and objects. This link supports the use of actions on the sub-
jective side of the subjective/objective equation: if goal-directed (or intentional) actions and subjective experiences
are represented by an identical set of neurons, then the explanatory gap might already be closed!5 But that closure
does not address the kernel of the hard problem: how could these neurons (or anything else) produce the richness of
phenomenal consciousness? For that problem we still need Humphrey’s time hypothesis.
Notice that the difference between color experience and that of other modalities does not yield to the introduction
of mirror neurons; it remains as stubborn as ever. If we can empathize with other’s experiences by observing their overt
actions, then however much we covertly experience those actions subjectively, we will not experience their “redding,”
since redding is not and never was an overt or intentional activity, as has been repeatedly argued here. But as has also
been argued, color experience comes along for the ride once we fully explain the “X factor,” which is the goal of
Chapter 6. Thus we now turn to the other major component of Humphrey’s theory: temporal thickness.
The extended present
As noted earlier, qualia can be experiences because the subjective present in which they occur is not instantaneous,
but extended or “thick.” Humphrey’s analogy is to a spaceship; I find that difficult, and instead picture a touring railroad
train, with glass windows framing a changing but well-defined landscape. In this touring train you can compare
different features of the scenery, and get an idea of the substantive whole, all at once, where you’re been and where
you’re going, and how the parts are related to each other, without having to piece it together inferentially from memory
(if this were even possible). In this analogy the changing spatial positions of objects seen from the train correspond
to short-term events that we seem to experience as taking place entirely in the present, during which we are aware
of both their beginnings and their ends. A temporal rather than a visual/spatial analogy would be preferable, but the
poverty of our time-language makes that difficult.
Only a few other philosophers have explored the idea of the extended present. The earliest references start in the
19th century.6 Husserl ’s contribution has been noted. In addition, see [5,7].
The notion of an extended, or “thick,” instant of time sounds like a contradiction. Time is a single dimension among
three spatial ones. A line extending into one spatial dimension cannot be “thick” without, it would seem, encroaching
on a second dimension. We think of time analogously: there is “room” for only one moment at “a time”; time seems
unidimensional in our ordinary experience and associated conceptual system, whatever alternative possibilities are
hypothesized by cosmologists and particle physicists. Time’s flow seems continuous with no breaks or sudden stops.
But as Humphrey points out, our experience of the present time is, paradoxically, thick, because we feel as if right
“now” we “have time” to direct and redirect our attention to different objects, watch brief events begin and end,
without these objects and events disappearing into the past where, according to our physical concepts, it is out of
sight, no longer happening. Of course we can remember the immediate past very vividly and compare the memory
5 Borg [1] argues that mirror neurons do not provide the specificity required for knowing fully another’s intentions; e.g. one perceives that another
intends to pick up a cup, but why, or then what? But if any degree of intentionality is captured by mirror neurons, then the gap is closed sufficiently
for Humphrey’s purposes.
6 mind.ucsd.edu/papers/bhtc/Andersen&Grush.pdf.
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Not Now. What we are calling Now does not include the Not Now, but it does include the time it takes for a brief event
to unfold before our eyes (or a short melody to be heard in its entirety by our ears), and that time is longer than an
instant. And not only do we experience events unfold in time, we also experience our selves to be a process unfolding
along with external events we witness. The conscious subject is experienced as inseparable from the present moment:
I am an actively perceiving body, not something outside the flow of events but part of it.
The above describes a paradox. Without retention and protention, there could be no conscious experience. Retention
and protention insert past and future into the present. That should mean that each present moment “lasts” longer
than an instant. But if each moment did last longer than an instant, the constant flow of experienced time would be
discontinuous, interrupted. Because we do not experience interruptions in the flow of events in time, we seem to have
experiences that cannot be coherently described. At the same time, however, we have the illusion that our experience
makes perfect sense.7
How can this subjective fact about our experience be explained by events in the physical brain? Humphrey appeals
to recently discovered “re-entrant circuits” [3], in which “neural activity loops back on itself” fast enough for the orig-
inal responses to interact with incoming stimuli. The process has become fast enough, because of the internalization in
evolution of responses to stimuli and consequent shortening of the neural feedback loop, that “sensory responses could
well react with the very input to which they are a response . . . ” (p. 122). Thus a superposition of already-processed
with new input takes place, creating the experience of the expansion of the present moment.
How would this superposition and sense of expansion explain the X factor? All we need, Humphrey argues, is
one more element: “a very fine tuning—a precise matching of output with input, so as to provide exactly the right
degree of reinforcement of the signal in the loop” (p. 123). In speaking of such a tuning mechanism he refers to a
quantitative superposition of distinct temporal moments of sensory response. The “matching of output with input”
must refer to neural activity. We can understand that the brain might well have a mechanism for this activity. But what
is still unclear is how the mechanism that operates on quantitatively described events in the sensory systems could
also explain the qualitative experience. Once again: the sensory events can be roughly analyzed into components of
neural activity—one component stored and recycled in reentrant loops or working memory, the other responding to
new input. Qualitative experiences cannot be so analyzed. They have no components that we can experience as such.
It might be the case that a processed quale can be somehow “matched” to a quale currently in process, but how this
could happen in the neurons of the brain is as much of a mystery as it ever was.
Humphrey partially confronts this objection, but his meaning is not entirely transparent. He writes:
. . . we have the possibility of something wonderfully well-tuned “emerging.” But do we really want to rely on
emergence to explain this?
[Previously] I implied that once the sensory response circuits have evolved to the point where they could in
principle support sustained feedback, the rest will follow simply as a matter of course. But the truth is, it is most
unlikely to happen automatically. In fact, it will not happen unless it is designed to happen, and this has to mean,
presumably, designed by natural selection.
But why? Whatever could be the payoff of feedback . . . that brings about a thickening of consciousness?
. . . I think the payoff is that it gives the subject quite a new sense of Self. It lifts the subject out of zombidom.”
(pp. 123–124)
7 Velleman [12] argues that illusions of this type are necessary grounding for our concept of self. He describes the illusions in terms of our
apparent experience of a self that is at each moment wholly unified, and also in terms of our paradoxical experience of time both passing and
standing still. Here is his account of the former illusion of the self:
The selves superimposed in this appearance are two momentary subjects: I in my present capacity as the subject of memory, existing just in
the moment of remembering, and the “I” of the remembered experience, who existed just in the moment of the experience. In either case, I am
conceived as wholly present at a single point in time, either as me-here-and-now, entertaining the memory, or as “me”-there-and-then, having
the experience. Superimposing one of these momentary subjects on the other yields the illusion that they are numerically identical—that the
subject whose existence was complete in the moment of the experience remembered was one and the same as the subject whose existence is
complete in the moment of remembering. This appearance is already incoherent if one and the same thing cannot have its existence confined to
each of two differing moments. The incoherence is compounded by the thought that this momentary subject has persisted through the interval
between the original experience and the memory, existing in its entirety at each intervening moment. (p. 9)
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nism, but on a different level from those in the brain. We still do not know how the step from quantitative to qualitative
events can take place; a theory of why it took place cannot help us there. Humphrey needs a mechanistic explana-
tion because he wants to go beyond a reliance on mere “emergence,” realizing that to say simply that a property has
emerged is to say nothing else about it at all. His evolutionary explanation is a good account of the value of conscious
experience, but this value could be appreciated only after its appearance, whether by emergence or in some other way.
There might be another way that arises naturally out of thick time itself; Humphrey himself refers to it in speaking
of “the substantiality that goes with existing in thick time” (p. 125). I think we could use more speculation about the
nature of that thick time, and about the substantiality. Physical, objective time is not thick; it has only one dimension.
To speak of existing in thick time is to speak of an expansion of familiar unidirectional time, of the creation of a private
experiential zone. Of course the existence that Humphrey refers to is subjective, not objective existence, but that is
exactly why thick time experience is inaccessible to anyone but its subject. It is not just because it is “subjective”
in the sense of “mental”; it is because it takes place in, we might say, a subjective temporal zone (in addition to the
objectively known spatial and temporal ones). If the theory of thick time is right, then each of us exists in our own
private temporal zone, one that simply does not exist from an objective point of view.
One way to think about thick time is by an analogy to space–time dimensionality. Imagine consciousness of the
present as occupying a fifth dimension in addition to the four-dimensional space–time continuum. It does not seem
wildly implausible that along with the known dimensions of our physical world there might be other dimensions
to which we have no objective access. The only difficulty in supposing this, that I can see, is that while the other
spatiotemporal dimensions are physically measurable this second temporal one is not obviously so. Pretend that there
is somehow room in the universe for time to expand sideways, at right angles to its forward direction. If we imagine
the experiencing agent able through neural connections to retain or superpose its representing of past, present and
future, so that they are all present together, then we are pretending or imagining that the time dimension can have
width in addition to length. And there is no mystery as to why you cannot experience my thick time. You cannot
co-occupy the space my body is occupying, either. My thick time exists only in my actions of creating it, which are
my intentional efforts to choose and plan my own goal-directed action.
How would this speculative idea explain qualia? In an unsatisfying but perhaps necessary way: the red we con-
sciously experience is the effect of red-responding events (not intentional actions) in the rods and cones, when they
are stretched out in thick time. In thick time, they take on substance. There is nothing corresponding to temporally
stretched-out response events in the objective world, so there is no way to measure or analyze them. Accordingly, there
is no way we can understand in objective terms how it is that stretched-out red and stretched-out lemon are distinct
phenomenal qualities. But there is also no reason at all for us to doubt that they could be, since their existence con-
tradicts nothing that is known about the objective world. They are not “mysterious” in the sense that is normally used
for “mental” events. Their brain mechanisms are clear. They are not other-worldly. They can be seen, in Humphrey’s
terms, as “deliberate trickery” on the part of the brain, if by that we understand that qualia have an illusory nature:
they seem to us, when thinking naively, to have the same ontological status as measurable objective events. That is
why we are so puzzled by them. If something like this were right then the X Factor itself has not been described in
ordinary objective terms, but the kind of thing it is would be clearer. It is what happens when sensory system responses
are fully expressed in an enriched and complex temporal span.
Humphrey asks why we should have evolved the ability to experience thick time. Of course it makes us valuable to
ourselves, but primarily it is because we are agents. Agency requires choice; choice requires comparison of options.
If the comparison is among various states within the organism itself, states accessible to the senses, then we would
have to be able to lay them out side by side, so to speak, so as to compare them in our subjectively present time. If
that were to be true, then conscious beings would be less constrained by the known spatiotemporal dimensions than
has been assumed. The sensory looping that creates thick time in an organism allows that organism to experience a
second temporal dimension, one in which our familiar qualia reside.
Would this supposed fifth dimension be “real?” What is its ontological status with respect to the known spatiotem-
poral dimensions, which we now understand to be equivalent to curvature of space–time? As conscious subjects do
we each, privately, create our own version of a fifth dimension, or was it there all along? I will not attempt answers
to such questions. The supposition of a fifth dimension is intended as an analogy only, not a hypothesis. Too many
details of possible mechanisms are missing.
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At the beginning of this review I said that the nonbodily nature of color experience, and to a lesser extent of other
modes of qualia, might be helpful in finding an explanation. Humphrey’s proposal of temporal thickness could be
just what is needed: a radically new perspective that is, at least possibly, compatible with physical science. “Seeing
Red” is a work of relentless honesty about what is clear and what is not clear, written in a lighthearted tone, and rich
with vivid explanations, and helpful, entertaining illustrations. It is a great pleasure to read. More importantly, it is
an invaluable contribution to the mind-body debate for three main reasons. First, it addresses the question of what
constitutes Selfhood in a way that is straightforward, parsimonious, and intuitively plausible. There is no multiplying
of perspectives on our experiencing and our experiences, there is only the experiencing itself. Second, in viewing
Selfhood in terms of Agency, and noting the analogies between experience and the bodily responses to sensation
Humphrey calls “expression” (pp. 81f), he makes an important contribution to the “embodiment” movement. Third,
in confronting the qualia problem, Humphrey employs the concept of the extended present more centrally and more
lucidly than we have yet seen in the contemporary consciousness debate, exposing an intriguing new perspective on
consciousness.
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